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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: Cyber-enabled crimes are on the increase, and law enforcement has had to expand many of their 
detecting activities into the digital domain. As such, the field of digital forensics has become far more 
sophisticated over the years and is now able to uncover even more evidence that can be used to support 
prosecution of cyber criminals in a court of law. Governments, too, have embraced the ability to track 
suspicious individuals in the online world. Forensics investigators are driven to gather data exhaustively, 
being under pressure to provide law enforcement with sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.  
Yet, there are concerns about the ethics and justice of untrammeled investigations on a number of levels. 
On an organizational level, unconstrained investigations could interfere with, and damage, the 
organization’s right to control the disclosure of their intellectual capital. On an individual level, those being 
investigated could easily have their legal privacy rights violated by forensics investigations. On a societal 
level, there might be a sense of injustice at the perceived inequality of current practice in this domain.  
This paper argues the need for a practical, ethically-grounded approach to digital forensic investigations, 
one that acknowledges and respects the privacy rights of individuals and the intellectual capital disclosure 
rights of organisations, as well as acknowledging the needs of law enforcement. We derive a set of ethical 
guidelines, then map these onto a forensics investigation framework. We subjected the framework to expert 
review in two stages, refining the framework after each stage. We conclude by proposing the refined 
ethically-grounded digital forensics investigation framework. Our treatise is primarily UK based, but the 
concepts presented here have international relevance and applicability.  
Design methodology: In this paper, the lens of justice theory is used to explore the tension that exists 
between the needs of digital forensic investigations into cybercrimes on the one hand, and, on the other, 
individuals’ rights to privacy and organizations’ rights  to control intellectual capital disclosure.  
Findings: The investigation revealed a potential inequality between the practices of digital forensics 
investigators and the rights of other stakeholders. That being so, the need for a more ethically-informed 
approach to digital forensics investigations, as a remedy, is highlighted, and a framework proposed to 
provide this.   
Practical Implications: Our proposed ethically-informed framework for guiding digital forensics 
investigations suggest a way of re-establishing the equality of the stakeholders in this arena, and ensuring 
that the potential for a sense of injustice is reduced.  
Originality/value: Justice theory is used to highlight the difficulties in squaring the circle between the 
rights and expectations of all stakeholders in the digital forensics arena. The outcome is the forensics 
investigation guideline, PRECEpt: Privacy-Respecting EthiCal framEwork, which provides the basis for a 
re-aligning of the balance between the requirements and expectations of digital forensic investigators on the 
one hand, and individual and organizational expectations and rights, on the other.  
Keywords: Forensics Investigations, Ethics, Privacy, Intellectual Capital. 
Paper type: Conceptual 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rawls’ (1991) Theory of Justice is built on two core principles: liberty and equality. Working in tandem, 
they designate that society ought be structured so that the greatest possible amount of liberty is provided to 
its members, the proviso being that the liberty of any one individual not be permitted to infringe upon that 
of any other. Moreover, any inequalities that do exist ought only to be permitted if equality would leave 
people worse off. Deutsch (1986) introduces the concept of distributive justice as a way of envisioning 
whether these principles are being achieved in any society. Deutsch reports on a number of experimental 
studies he carried out to investigate the sense of injustice in society, and recounts a range of insights gained 
from these. Of particular relevance to our context is that those who are disadvantaged by inequality are 
more sensitive to the injustice thereof than those who are advantaged by such inequalities. Adams (1965) 
argues that an experience of injustice should not be an accepted fact of life. Kant’s categorical imperative 
(O’Neill, 1993) requires everyone to act only in such a way that they would consider fair if applied 
universally across society. Deutsch (1986) argues that sensitivity to injustice across society can be increased 
by acknowledgement of inequalities and by providing viable remedies. 
The focus in this paper is on digital forensics investigations, and their potential for being perceived as 
unjust. George Orwell’s infamous Big Brother (Orwell, 1949) has, for some, materialized some six decades 
after the book was published (Sorell and Draper, 2012) due to ubiquitous digital surveillance and rapacious 
digital investigations. David Patterson, then ACM President (Patterson, 2005) expressed these concerns 
trenchantly: “We must protect the security and privacy of computer and communication users from 
criminals and terrorists while preventing the Orwellian vision of Big Brother. Computer and 
communication in the 21st century should be as safe as 20th century banking” (p. 16).  
In the digital forensics domain, it is appropriate for us to ensure that there is no injustice in the way digital 
forensics investigations are carried out, because the day might come when any one of us could become the 
subject of such an investigation. Moreover, as Irons and Konstadopoulou (2007) argue, the field of digital 
forensics requires a codified body of principles as well as standards for ethics and practice if it is to be 
considered a profession. Dehghantanha and Franke (2014) make a strong case for the need of a framework 
for privacy-respecting digital investigations, but do not propose such a framework themselves. Aminnezhad 
et al. (2012) write a treatise on the tensions between digital forensics investigators and privacy preserving 
technologies, but they, too, do not propose a framework to resolve the tensions. Antoniou et al. (2006) and 
Croft and Olivier (2010) do propose privacy-preserving frameworks, but the measures they deploy are 
technological, and not ethically-grounded, which is what we are proposing to do, as advocated by Irons and 
Konstadopoulou (2007). Why specifically a framework? Because a framework has the ability to structure, 
guide and inform investigations, providing a way for investigators to chart their progress. Moreover, its very 
structured nature serves as a convenient harness for highlighting pertinent ethical considerations as 
investigators work through the stages during their investigations.  
Figure 1 depicts this paper’s argument and layout. We commence by highlighting the current state of play in 
the digital forensics investigation domain (Section 2). In particular, we present both sides of an apparent 
impasse: individual and organizational rights on the one hand, and forensics investigation capabilities on 
the other. We argue for the need to home in on an elusive “sweet spot”, which maximizes utility for 
stakeholders on both sides of the metaphorical tug-of-war. Section 2 ends with a road map outlining the 
rest of the paper, which presents the perspectives of digital forensics investigations (Section 3), and those of 
individuals and organizations (Section 4). Principle lists of basic privacy, intellectual capital, investigation 
guidelines and ethical principles are derived from the research literature and enumerated for subsequent 
use in deriving the framework.  
Section 5 then compiles a set of ethical principles which can guide and inform digital forensics 
investigations. Section 6 discusses the tensions between the two somewhat opposing perspectives. Section 7 
brings all the new insights together to propose a privacy-respecting framework that balances these tensions, 
in effect driving us towards the “sweet spot” we propose in Section 2. The framework incorporates eight 
forensic investigation stages, which are mapped onto the listed ethical principles as well as the challenges 
constituted by “dark clouds” caused by the emergence of modern privacy-protecting technologies.  
Section 7 details our expert evaluation of the framework, in two phases, and presents the final PRECEPT 
framework. Section 8 concludes.  
 
Figure 1: The derivation of the ethical framework (Section numbers indicated within the diagram) 
The contributions of this paper are three-fold: First, we apply justice theory to the field of digital forensics 
investigations. Second, propose a set of eleven ethical principles to inform digital forensics investigations. 
Third, we provide an ethically informed privacy-respecting digital investigation framework that was 
subjected to expert review as a remedy in terms of introducing a sense of equality and justice back into this 
domain.   
2. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
Technology has changed our lives, mostly for the better. Yet there are undeniably those who elect to use 
computing power for nefarious purposes. When their activities come to light, law enforcement seizes 
devices for analysis by forensics experts. Forensics investigations in the physical realm have a long and 
illustrious history (Locard, 1904); digital forensics emerged much later in response to the rising incidence 
of cyber crime.  
Computer forensic evidence has been used since the mid 1990s in the UK, although there was “ad hoc” use 
of computer evidence in the decade before that (Swarb.co.uk, 2019). The first forensic computing company, 
AccessData, was established in the late 1980s. In the UK, a fraud case in the Northumbria Police region in 
1994 was one of the first to use computer evidence (Turner, 1994). The UK’s Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) produced their first set of guidelines for dealing with computer evidence in 1996, 
contributing towards a more structured approach to gathering computer evidence1. Rigorous forensics 
procedures became established, almost organically, and were quickly adopted by forensics investigators 
(McKemmish, 1999). Universities in the UK started to consider cybercrime in ethics modules in the late 
1990s, which then led to the consideration of digital evidence both within education and by crime 
investigations. This, in turn, led to the development of specialist modules, and programmes in Computer 
Forensics and Ethical Hacking were established in the late 1990s / early 2000s (Lemos, 2007). Although it 
would appear that computer forensics has been established for a number of years, it remains a relatively 
new field, as compared to other kinds of forensics investigations carried out by law enforcement. As recently 
as 2009, Irons et al. debated whether computer forensics was a branch of computer science, a branch of 
forensic science or a discipline in its own right, and concluded that it is indeed a distinct discipline, meriting 
independent professional status. This confirms Longhetti’s argument made in 1983: “There is literally no 
end to the number of disciplines that become ‘forensic’ by definition. Nor is there an end in sight to the 
number of present or future specialties that may become forensic. The examples are many” (p. 3). 
Prosecution of cyber crimes has required the enactment of laws, in the USA the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act and in the UK the Computer Misuse Act, for example. Yet in the USA there are concerns that the 
																																								 																				
1	https://www.digital-detective.net/acpo-good-practice-guide-for-digital-evidence/	
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, now three decades old, uses overly vague language, is being interpreted by 
different prosecutors in different ways, and needs to be reviewed (O’Driscoll, 2018). In the UK, the 
Computer Misuse Act was enacted in 1990, and reviewed in 2002. Macewan  (2008) welcomes the changes, 
arguing that the original act was born prematurely and was too weak to cope with the challenges presented 
when the Internet arrived in force. Yet Macewan also argues that the updated act has some problems, in 
particular, that provisions: “invite controversy, could sometimes prove difficult to interpret or enforce, and 
may lead to claims of legislative overkill” (p. 7). These are the signs of a forensics discipline coming into its 
own, and laying down rigorous principles and practices. 
The field of digital forensics has developed established processes and procedures to ensure that the 
outcomes of such investigations produce evidence that can be used to prosecute miscreants (Casciani, 
2019). It is important for such forensics investigations to be carried out as rigorously as any other kind of 
investigation. Judges in the USA determine the admissibility of digital evidence by using the Daubert test 
(Adams, 2012), while Ward (2015) reports on a version of this test that has been adopted in England and 
Wales, called the Practice Direction. These tests require the use of a forensics methodology that has been 
subjected to peer review, and for which the error rate is known. In addition to ensuring that their 
investigation methodology satisfies the Daubert and similar tests, forensics investigators have to keep up 
with ongoing technological advances and stay ahead of increasingly sophisticated cyber criminals (Pool and 
Custers, 2017). Law Enforcement has risen to the digital forensics investigation challenge. The UK’s College 
of Policing (2015) states that: “The Internet is now in most of our homes and while it is a great 
convenience for us, it also comes with a darker side and these materials and ‘how to’ investigate guides 
and videos will help staff to raise their awareness of investigative capability and signpost them to experts 
who can help further.” The USA’s Officer.Com website (2019) states that “With the proper training and 
equipment, any law enforcement officer can use the software programs used to extract data from phones 
in order to strengthen a case”.  
This brief summary demonstrates that the field of digital forensics, though relatively young, has earned the 
right to call itself a discipline, and that law enforcement and educational institutions are developing 
training to ensure that effective investigations can indeed be carried out in the digital world to support law 
enforcement. Recently even traditional crimes have been prosecuted with the help of digital forensics to 
provide evidence of previous online activities, such as Google searches, to demonstrate premeditation (The 
Investigator, undated).  
Concerns related to the way many of these investigations are carried out have been expressed (Big Brother 
Watch, 2019, Sloan, 2015). Traditional investigations are constrained by law, with well-established codes of 
practice restricting traditional law enforcement investigations. To many, it seems as if digital investigations 
are not yet as tightly monitored and constrained, and that individual and organizational rights might be 
sacrificed in the process (Big Brother Watch, 2018). A recent case in the USA is pertinent here. In the case 
of Carpenter v. The United States, the FBI had accessed mobile phone connection location data, without a 
warrant (Oyez, 2018). The Supreme Court ruled, in 2018, that this had breached his privacy rights and 
stated that future investigations of this kind should undergo judicial overview.  
It is interesting to note that the College of Policing website, in discussing their cybercrime courses, do not 
mention privacy, and their Code of Ethics (2014) does not mention privacy or cyber crime at all.  The 
Officer.Com website (2019) also does not mention privacy in their article. Harrington (2014) argues that 
digital examiners are not well equipped to manage the ethical dilemmas created by forensics investigations, 
concluding that: “the reasons include the lack of industry regulation, a paucity of ethics coverage in 
training curricula, and that the law applied to this subject matter is not well settled”. This suggests that 
ethical norms have not yet solidified due to the newness of the field.  
Figure 2 depicts the tension between the needs of law enforcement, on the one hand, and privacy and 
confidentiality rights of individuals and businesses, on the other, as prevalent today as it was in 2005. The 
arrows at the top and bottom depict the forces pulling in opposite directions. In the interests of societal 
justice, the situating of the “sweet spot” needs to be seriously considered, and the tensions pulling it in 
either direction explored. The aim is to ensure a balance that respects the rights of all stakeholders and 
maximises equality and liberty for all. Here we propose a framework to inform such investigations, in our 
attempt to start homing in on this “Sweet Spot”. 
 
Figure 2: The Tension between Privacy & Confidentiality Desires and Rights, and  
Forensics Investigation Needs and Capabilities 
Other researchers have also proposed and reviewed forensics investigation frameworks. Agarwal and 
Kothari (2015) reviewed a number of forensics frameworks, but do not mention privacy considerations. 
Gupta (2013) proposes automating much of the investigation to maximise privacy. Aminnezhad et al. 
(2012) reviews the privacy challenges of privacy in forensics investigations, concluding that some privacy 
invasion is unavoidable, and raises the point that privacy decisions are ambiguous by nature, with decisions 
being made subjectively by an investigator perhaps not matching the expectations of the person being 
investigated. Their recommendation is that people should deploy privacy-preserving technologies to 
prevent wholesale privacy invasion. Ieong (2006) proposes a framework that incorporates legal strictures 
from the USA, but does not mention privacy.  
 Some researchers have proposed specific privacy-preserving digital forensics investigative frameworks. For 
example, Nieto et al. (2018) propose a framework called PRoFIT, which aims to elicit the cooperation of the 
citizen into the digital investigation process, respecting the 11 ISO privacy principles at the relevant stage of 
the investigative process. While this framework achieves its aim of privacy preservation, one can imagine 
that its applicability will be somewhat limited, given the fact that few criminals will cooperate in an 
investigation of their devices. Halboob et al. (2011, 2015) propose four privacy levels of data that could be 
uncovered in a forensics investigation, and suggest that courts of law could enforce these to protect the 
investigatee’s privacy during forensics investigations.    
In deriving the PRECEPT framework, a justice theory perspective is applied, the first time the tensions have 
been explored using this lens. 
In order to develop the framework for this paper, a “mixed methods” methodology was adopted. This 
approach was selected in order to draw on existing processes, procedures and frameworks and then to 
design the proposed framework and undertake an initial test of the framework. The initial data was 
gathered via a desktop review of existing processes and procedures used for digital forensic investigations in 
the UK. Particular emphasis was placed on investigating UK legislation, UK procedures (e.g. ACPO) which 
shape law enforcement practices and the theory, literature and legislation surrounding privacy and the 
rights of individuals and organisations in the UK.  
Figure 3 shows how this investigation was structured, with the notations used throughout the paper 
indicated within the diagram. 
 
 
Figure 3: Mapping Privacy Principles (Pi), Intellectual Capital Communications Principles (ICi) and 
Investigation Guidelines (EGi) to Ethical Principles (Ei), and then aligning these with the stages involved in 
forensics investigations (Si) and the challenges introduced by the Dark Clouds (DCi), producing the 
PRECEPT framework. 
 
3. FORENSICS INVESTIGATION PERSPECTIVE 
Digital evidence can be used in a range of different types of investigations. For example, digital forensic 
evidence can be used in organisations to investigate behavioral or disciplinary concerns or internal fraud. 
Forensics investigations are carried out to uncover evidence of crime, or to detect suspicious behaviors that 
might lead to a crime or precede a terrorist incident. These are both essential activities, the first being 
carried out to lead to a successful prosecution, the second to prevent carnage. The forensics investigator 
systematically analyses data from a suspect’s device(s), such as conversations, contacts or evidence of 
accessing dubious online materials, to gather and accumulate incriminating evidence. The investigation 
may lead the investigator also to explore other people’s devices if there is evidence that they, too, might be 
of interest or involved in the crime.  
Forensics investigations are informed by three guidelines: (1) the Core Investigative Doctrine (CENTREX, 
2015), (2) the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996, which lays out a code of practice for 
criminal investigations, and (3) the Association of Chief Police Officers, which has published a “good 
practice guide” for digital evidence (ACPO, 2012). The first two are not specific to cyber crimes.  
The digital forensics investigator faces a number of challenges beyond the fact that such doctrines are not 
specific to their endeavors. Karie et al. (2015) present four categories of challenges that forensics 
investigators face: (1) technical, (2) legal, (3) personnel-related, and (4) operational. Within the focus of this 
discussion, the first two are worth exploring.  
In terms of technical challenges, the growing problem for forensics investigators is that it is becoming more 
and more difficult to gather such evidence from computer systems that are now designed with built-in 
privacy and security (Langheinrich, 2001). In essence, as systems become resistant to the efforts of hackers, 
they also resist the forensic investigations.  The use of add-on privacy-respecting tools, and their 
incorporation into operating systems, has become widespread and increasingly effective (Caviglioni et al., 
2017).  This means that society is reaching a point where everyone can enforce his or her own privacy. 
An exception to this may be a reduced expectation of privacy for company-owned equipment used by 
employees e.g. mobile phones and computers. Employers will often place restrictions on access or on user 
installation of software so that they can undertake their own investigations should the need arise. In such 
instances, particularly where the employee may also use the equipment for personal reasons, they would 
have to accept a much lower expectation of privacy (Margulis, 2003). Privacy concerns do arise however, for 
example, when employees use their own equipment for work-based activities. In such cases, there are 
ethical concerns as to which circumstances an employer could demand a restriction on the installation of 
privacy protection software on an employee’s personal phone or laptop.  It is quite conceivable therefore, 
that the death of an employee could render forensic investigations of an organizational data breach, 
impossible, especially if there is no record of the relevant passwords. The blurring of the distinctions 
between employee and employer, and the ownership of equipment as well as personal data is increasingly 
problematic (Brown, 2000). The growth in the use of contractors, workers and self-employed contractors 
who may use their own equipment to undertake business tasks means that organizations may find that their 
access is somewhat restricted. These people may not be subject to the restrictions on privacy and use of 
equipment that an employee would, and therefore permission to access the data on that equipment may be 
refused. 
Systems using privacy-enhancing tools are essentially resistant to forensics investigations: the systems repel 
all and any incomers.  As we write, forensics investigations are stymied by the increasing use of these 
technologies and are unable to gather sufficient evidence to support prosecution (Ferguson et al., 2018). 
This paper does not address the technical challenges mentioned by Ferguson et al., only incorporates their 
influence into our proposed framework.  
The legal challenges mentioned by Karie et al. (2015) that pertain to our investigation include: the laws 
constraining the activities of investigators, ethical issues, and privacy concerns. These challenges are 
confirmed by NIST (2015). Some countries do not permit surveillance of their own citizens without judicial 
overview (Forgang, 2009, Oyez, 2018). Other countries permit surveillance without review (UK 
Government, 2016). Blum (2006) highlight the trans-jurisdictional and international challenges, which 
make it difficult for governments to prosecute cyber criminals outside their borders, especially if the 
criminal resides in a country that does not have an extradition treaty with them. In the UK, where the 
authors reside, there are a number of guidelines that inform digital forensics investigations. These are 
helpful in giving us an insight into one specific country’s perspectives. 
3.1. INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES 
This section considers the guidelines provided to inform forensics investigations. To enumerate these, three 
sources were consulted: (1) the Core Investigative Doctrine (CENTREX, 2015), (2) the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996, which lays out a code of practice for criminal investigations, and (3) the 
Association of Chief Police Officers, which has published a “good practice guide” for digital evidence (ACPO, 
2012). A set of 10 investigative guidelines were derived, referred to as IGi, from these sources, as 
enumerated in Table 1.  
# Extracts from sources 
IG1 Exhaustively investigate: 
“In conducting an investigation, the investigator should pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether 
these point towards or away from the suspect… For example, where material is held on computer, it is a 
matter for the investigator to decide which material on the computer it is reasonable to inquire into, and in 
what manner.” (Ministry of Justice, Section 3.5) 
On page 63 of (CENTREX, 2015), the investigation phase mindset includes: Gathering “the maximum 
amount of material”.  
IG2 Comprehensively record all information: 
 “That information which is obtained in the course of a criminal investigation and may be relevant to the 
investigation is recorded.”  (CPIA, Part II) 
IG3 Investigate all relevant related parties: 
No mention of investigations only into relevant third parties. 
“If the officer in charge of an investigation believes that other persons may be in possession of material 
that may be relevant to the investigation, and if this has not been obtained under paragraph 3.5 above, he 
should ask the disclosure officer to inform them of the existence of the investigation and to invite them to 
retain the material in case they receive a request for its disclosure.” (Ministry of Justice, Section 3.6) 
IG4 Sensitive material should be recorded but marked as such: 
 “If there is any sensitive unused material the officer should complete a sensitive material schedule (MG6D 
or similar) and attach it to the prosecution file. In exceptional circumstances, when its existence is so 
sensitive that it cannot be listed, it should be revealed to the prosecutor separately.” (Ministry of Justice, 
Section 6.7) 
IG5 Record Intangible information: 
 “If material which may be relevant to the investigation consists of information which is not recorded in 
any form, the officer in charge of an investigation must ensure that it is recorded in a durable or 
retrievable form.” (Ministry of Justice, Section 4.1) 
“An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence should be created and preserved. 
An independent third party should be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result.” (p. 6) 
(Principle 3, ACPO, 2012) 
IG6 Give prosecutor record of gathered information: 
 “…the prosecutor ... is given a written statement that prescribed activities … that have been carried out.” 
(CPIA, Part II) 
The prosecutor must — 
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material … , or 
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description mentioned in paragraph 
(a). (CPIA, Part I) 
IG7 Retain all information: 
Fourth principle of investigative mindset (CENTREX, 2015): “Recording and Collation”.  
(1) The code may include provision about the form in which information is to be recorded. 
(2) The code may include provision about the manner in which and the period for which— 
(a) a record of information is to be retained, and 
(b) any other material is to be retained; 
(CPIA, Part II) 
 
“The duty to retain material, where it may be relevant to the investigation, also includes in particular the 
duty to retain material which may satisfy the test for prosecution disclosure in the Act, such as:  
information provided by an accused person which indicates an explanation for the offence with which he 
has been charged;  any material casting doubt on the reliability of a confession;  any material casting 
doubt on the reliability of a prosecution witness. 
The duty to retain material falling into these categories does not extend to items which are purely ancillary 
to such material and possess no independent significance (for example, duplicate copies of records or 
reports).” (Ministry of Justice, Sections 5.5 & 5.6). 
IG8 Allow accused to inspect information: 
“the accused is allowed to inspect it [the information] or is given a copy of it.” (CPIA, Part II) 
 
“…that the person who is to allow the accused to inspect information or other material or to give him a 
copy of it shall decide which of those (inspecting or giving a copy) is appropriate;”  (CPIA, Part II) 
IG9 Investigators must be competent to report on investigation:  
“In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data, that person must be competent 
to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions.” (p. 6) 
(Principle 2, ACPO, 2012) 
IG10 Information Integrity should be maintained:  
“No action taken by law enforcement agencies, persons employed within those agencies or their agents 
should change data which may subsequently be relied upon in court.” (p. 6) (Principle 1, ACPO, 2012) 
“The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and these 
principles are adhered to.” (p. 6) (Principle 4, ACPO, 2012) 
Table 1: Investigation Guidelines 
4. INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
The digital investigator’s perspectives are discussed in the previous section. Yet the right to privacy seems 
to constitute a fifth challenge, an addition to Karie et al. (2015)’s list of forensics investigator challenges. 
This expectation, and use of privacy-protecting tools, impacts forensics investigations. Moreover, when it 
comes to organizations being investigated, there is also a need to consider how intellectual capital is 
potentially impacted by forensics investigations. Here, the other stakeholders are considered: first the 
individual (Section 4.1) and then the organizational (Section 4.2)  perspectives and expectations.  
4.1. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The study and concerns of privacy are multi- and cross-disciplinary and include sociology (Rule, 1974, 
Winner, 1992), Law, (Warren and Brandeis, 1890), history (Westin, 1967) political science (Bennett, 1996) 
and philosophy (Schoeman, 1984), and yet we are still never too sure what privacy actually is or what its 
limits are highlighted by several contributors in Barendt (2001). Many governments are serious enough 
about such privacy rights to enact privacy-related legislation and to impose punitive fines for organizational 
failures in this respect (Bischoff, 2018, EU Parliament, 2018). Privacy has been described as the protection 
of someone’s personal space and their right to be left alone (Warren and Brandeis 1890); the control over 
and safeguarding of personal information (Westin 2003); and an aspect of dignity, autonomy, and 
ultimately human freedom (Schoeman 1992). These definitions pertain to the boundaries between the self 
and the others or between private and public, but ultimately fail to provide a universally accepted 
viewpoint. 
The right to, and nature of, privacy continues to be debated and has been included in discussions about 
fundamental ethical questions such as liberty (Mill, 1869) natural rights (Forester and Morrison, 1995) and 
core values (Moor, 2006). These discussions often conclude that privacy is chiefly an element of security 
(Moor, 2006) or a property right, which one can retain or dispose of in much the same way as any other 
possession (Thomson, 1975).  Fairweather (2001 p. 310) however, would refute this view to contend that 
‘children should be entitled to sexual privacy of a sort that it would not be acceptable to buy or sell.’ (p. 
310). More recently, some of the earlier examinations of the nature and expectations of privacy are being 
challenged as social media and ever-increasing covert surveillance affect experiences of privacy (Dienlin 
and Trepte, 2015). 
Even if privacy is a right in its own sense, rather than as an add-on to other rights, there are differing 
opinions as to the extent and scope of that right. As Etzioni suggests, ‘giving up some measure of privacy 
serves the common good’ (Etzioni, 1997 p. 1). This view is echoed by lawmakers and security chiefs the 
world over (Liberty, 2017, Strohm, 2017, Weinberg, 2015) and would almost certainly be seen as important 
for forensic investigators looking to access data and following digital footprints around the Internet. The 
NPCC (2019), responding to criticism from Big Brother Watch about their demands for rape victims to 
allow full access to their mobile phones, say: “Police have a duty to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry 
in every investigation and to meet the disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act. In this digital age, reasonable lines of enquiry often include the examination of 
material stored on or accessed by digital devices”.  
The media and wider society also promote the view that there should be limits on the amount of privacy 
anyone can expect in that ‘individual rights need to be balanced with social responsibilities’ (Deacon, 1998 
p. 6). This communitarian viewpoint creates a strong argument against the idea of a fundamental right to 
privacy, as it also considers that ‘autonomous selves do not exist in isolation, but are shaped by the values 
and culture of communities’ (King, 2001 p.16).  In this context, the authors consider that the right to 
privacy needs to be  (Scott-Hayward et al., 2015) against individual action, so that any expectation of 
privacy is diminished when issues of safety and security within society take priority over individual needs 
(Kounadi et al., 2015). To inform development of our framework, our deliberations will be grounded in the 
ISO/IEC 29100:2011 standard (ISO, 2011), which  enumerates 11 privacy principles, referred to in this 
paper as Pi, as listed in Table 2.  
P1 Consent & choice P7 Openness, transparency & notice 
P2 Purpose legitimacy and specification P8 Individual participation and access 
P3 Collection limitation P9 Accountability 
P4 Data minimization P10 Information security controls 
P5 Use, retention and disclosure limitation P11 Compliance 
P6 Accuracy and quality   
Table 2: Privacy Principles 
  
 
4.2. ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL NEEDS 
Dumay (2016) defines intellectual capital as “the sum of everything everybody in a company knows that 
gives it a competitive edge […] Intellectual Capital is intellectual material, knowledge, experience, 
intellectual property, information […] that can be put to use to create [value].” [p. 169]. 
Intellectual capital (IC) makes up a large percentage of a company’s market value (Blair and Wallman, 
2000). Indeed, Klaila and Hall (2000) carried out case studies to show how newly discovered IC was able to 
effect drastic improvements to the organizations’ balance sheets.  Leal at al., (2017) cite (Barney, 1991; 
Chen et al., 2005) to make the point that intellectual capital is a vital strategic asset, that it is capable of 
giving organizations a competitive advantage and impacts their financial performance. Inkinen (2015) 
report that there is a significant relationship between IC and an organization’s innovative performance and 
Obeidat et al. (2017) find that IC had a positive impact on organizational performance and knowledge 
sharing. This is confirmed by many other studies, for example, Maditinos et al. (2000); Abeysekera (2006); 
Edvinsson, and Sullivan (1996). Moreover, Guthrie and Petty (2000) argue that IC is even more important 
in the 21st century because many large corporations have shifted from manufacturing to offering more 
technologically-focused services, where IC is somewhat intangible, but still valuable.  
Brown et al. (2005) explain that intellectual capital has to be protected and managed by utilizing a life-cycle 
management process. In terms of protecting intellectual capital, Brown et al. advise that an information 
classification scheme be used. They recommend having a set of policies and procedures that align with these 
classifications to control whether or not intellectual capital elements are disclosed. They also recommend 
using access control measures to protect any intellectual capital that is stored within IT systems. This leads 
to our first assertion: (Assertion 1) IC is valuable.  
Having established that IC is valuable, the next question is whether organizations need to act to protect and 
preserve their intellectual capital. Some researchers have indeed highlighted disclosure-related risks to IC. 
Dumay and Guthrie (2017) argue that involuntary disclosures introduce both opportunities and threats to 
organizations and that these introduce organizations to new risks. Mouritsen et al. (2001) refer to the 
controlled disclosure of IC as a way of disseminating a “true and fair” account of the firm’s activities. 
Brennan (2001) discovered, in her study of the reports of Irish companies, that the majority of companies 
disclosed very limited amounts of their IC. It seems that IC tends to be kept confidential. White et al. 
(2007) report that smaller companies demonstrate more reluctance to disclose than larger ones. Sciulli et 
al. (2002) analyzed the IC reporting of Australian councils and found that IC reporting was 
underdeveloped. They argue that the reasons for such paucity of disclosure are unclear, but need 
investigation. Indeed, Vanini and Rieg (2019) argue that companies: “should only engage in voluntary ICD 
if it really reduces information asymmetries and leads to reduced cost of capital or a better reputation” 
(p. 349). Whatever the reasons, it is clear that companies do not happily make all their IC publicly available.  
This leads to our second assertion: (Assertion 2) IC disclosure should be controlled.  
Organizations want to control the disclosure of their IC, if indeed they decide to disclose any at all (Dumay, 
2016). If such controls fail, is it an issue? Baugh et al. (1997) detail the damage that can occur if IC is leaked 
and companies are not able to control its disclosure. Mohamed et al. (2006) also highlight the losses of 
intellectual capital if the organization does not act to preserve it. Finally, Mitrović and Kneţević (2016) 
considers the risks of financial accounting, and cites uncontrolled disclosure as a specific risk in this space. 
In more general terms, Laperche (2018) also warns against uncontrolled disclosure, which could harm the 
organization’s competitiveness. This leads to our third assertion: (Assertion 3) If IC is leaked or disclosure  
uncontrolled, it could damage the organization. The EFFAS Commission On Intellectual Capital (CIC, 
2008) publish a list of intellectual capital specific effective communication principles, which will be 
referred to later in this paper as ICi (Table 3). These should be given due consideration when contemplating 
the ethics of forensics investigations within organizations.  
 
 
IC1 Clear link to future value creation IC6 Alignment of interests between company and investors 
IC2 Transparency of methodology IC7 Prevention of information overflow 
IC3 Standardization IC8 Reliability and responsibility 
IC4 Consistency over time IC9 Risk assessment 
IC5 Balanced trade-off between disclosure and privacy IC10 Effective disclosure placement and timing 
Table 3: Effective Intellectual Capital Communication Principles 
5. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
The investigative needs of governments and law enforcement were discussed (Section 3), as were the 
individual rights to privacy and organizational rights to confidentiality (Section 4). The aim, in writing this 
paper, was to derive a framework to inform ethical privacy-protecting forensics investigations, where the 
balance of power is not skewed in any one direction, where equality is balanced and injustice minimized. As 
a next step, therefore, a set of ethical principles is derived to inform the development of the framework.  
5.1. GENERIC ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
In 1992, Anderson et al. published a Code of Ethics in Decision Making. Number 1.7 is “Respect the privacy 
of others.” The IEEE Code of Ethics2, on the other hand, does not mention respect for privacy at all. Neither 
of these is specific to digital forensics. The ACM code of ethics general principles 1.6 however explicitly 
states that ‘computing professional should become conversant in the various definitions and forms of 
privacy and should understand the rights and responsibilities associated with the collection and use of 
personal information’(ACM Committee on Professional Ethics, 2018).  
There are three widely used ethical guidelines that inform human-related experiments (American 
Psychological Association (2016); The Belmont Report (1979); The British Psychological Society). Their 
guidelines can be combined to arrive at the following five principles (Renaud and Zimmermann, 2018): (1) 
Respect, (2) Justice, (3) Beneficence, (4) Integrity, and (5) Social Responsibility. These inform experiments, 
but seem to be equally applicable to the forensics investigator’s actions, since it is generally a human whose 
activities are being investigated. Hence these five principles can function as overarching ethical principles 
for the purposes of this discussion. 
5.2. FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
If the focus is narrowed to ethical concerns related to the forensics process, Saleem et al. (2014) make the 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” privacy. He cites Deng et al. (2010) to explain that hard privacy 
means sharing as little data as possible. Soft privacy, on the other hand, implies that the subject of the 
investigation loses control over their data and have to trust the professionalism of the investigator: that they 
will keep it confidential unless it is specifically required by law to disclose it.  
Sloan (2015) argues that there is a need for a code of ethics for digital forensics, but that there isn’t a 
universally accepted one at the moment and Losavio et al. (2016) agree. Karia (2010) also highlights the 
need for digital forensics investigations to be conducted within an ethical framework. Papers mentioning 
ethics in Digital Forensics were searched for. They fell naturally into three main categories, with respect to 
their treatment of privacy: 
Those referring to the need for (hard) privacy considerations to constrain investigations: 
● Van Staden (2013): “This paper considers the key aspects surrounding privacy protection 
of third parties during the post mortem data analysis phase of digital forensic investigations.” 
(p.19). 
● Law et al. (2011): “To enable the protection of data privacy, personal data that are not related to 
the investigation subject should be excluded during computer forensic examination” (p.1). 
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● Losavio et al. (2015): “This highlights the twin challenges of forensic accessibility in these highly 
mobile devices and the intense privacy concerns which may now accompany the profiles of people 
in ways never before possible.” (p.45). 
● John (2012): “identify and bookmark privacy concerns, e.g. files with credit card numbers or home 
addresses;” (p.2). 
● Stahl et al. (2010): “While security is of relevance to safeguard privacy, the powerful security and 
forensics technology contain the potential to do the opposite. Indeed, in the case of forensics 
technology, the very point of its application to render data visible that users want to hide” (p.1824) 
● Roux and Falgoust (2012): “Addressing privacy concerns often involves evaluating specific details 
of the situation, the agents involved, and the agents’ expectations.” (p.43). 
● Nikkel (2014): “driving the need to explore voluntarily set ethical boundaries to reduce the risk of 
abuse, and protect the privacy of individuals touched by incident response and forensic 
investigation activity. ” (p. 5). 
● Balogun and Zuva, 2017 citing Rössler, 2005: “When mechanisms that ensure the confidentiality of 
data flowing through the systems are not put into place, such data become susceptible to 
unauthorized access by third parties as well as misuse by authorized parties” (p.57).  
● Srinivasan (2007) proposes ten policies of  privacy-respecting forensics investigations. 
 
Those referring to the need for confidentiality (soft privacy): disclosure when mandated: 
● Digital Forensics Certification Board (undated): “Not disclose or reveal any confidential or 
privileged information obtained during an engagement without proper authorization or otherwise 
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction;” This applies to disclosure, not gathering in the first 
place.  
● ISFCE (2019): “Reveal any confidential matters or knowledge learned in an examination without 
an order from a court of competent jurisdiction or with the express permission of the client” 
● GIAC (undated): “I will protect confidential and proprietary information with which I come into 
contact.” 
● Karie and Venter, 2015: “Privacy is very important to any organization or victim. Though, in 
special cases the investigator may be required to share the data or compromise the client’s privacy 
to get to the truth.” (p.15). 
● Irons and Konstadopoulou, 2001: “This process should include evidence of exhibiting the highest 
level of ethical behaviour at all times, and maintaining objectivity and confidentiality during an 
investigation.” (p.49). 
 
Those referring neither to confidentiality nor privacy: 
● Basset et al. (2006): “Uncover all files: normal, hidden, deleted, encrypted, password-protected” 
and “Access the protected and encrypted files, if legal” - so no mention of privacy as a constraint.  
● Sharevski (2015) reviewed the codes of ethics for 12 organizations ranging from the American 
Academy of Forensic Science to the SANS Institute and the International Society of Forensic 
Computer Examiners.  He consolidated 10 categories of ethical considerations, none of which refer to 
the privacy of the person being investigated.  
● Other codes of ethics: Forensics Science Regulator (2014), Grobler et al., 2006; Seigfried-Spellar and 
Rogers, 2017. 
 
 
 
5.3. DIGITAL FORENSICS ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
It is interesting to note that whereas a number of academic papers refer to the need to respect the privacy of 
the person being investigated, none of the published digital forensics codes of ethics specifically include this 
tenet, which means that privacy considerations are probably not informing law enforcement investigations 
at present. Table 4 thus consolidates all the recommendations into a set of 10 ethical principles, which can 
serve to guide ethical digital forensics investigations, and maps these to the privacy principles from Table 2, 
the IC communications principles from Table 3, and the generic ethical principles from Renaud and 
Zimmermann (2018).   
6. THE TENSIONS 
A trusting relationship between citizens and state is built on the assumption that government will 
legitimately gather personal information to undertake the administration of state activities or for national 
security reasons (Whitley, 2009). In addition, democratic governments need to trust that most of their 
citizens are law abiding and can be left to get on with their lives. The balance of this relationship requires 
 
Ethical 
Principle 
 
 
Detail 
 
 
Privacy 
Principle 
 
IC Comms 
Principle 
Generic 
Ethical 
Principle 
E1 Delineate Remit: 
Commence by carefully delineating the remit of the investigation 
(Nikkel, 2014, Srinivasan, 2007). 
P2, P3  Respect 
Social 
Responsibility 
E2 Respect the privacy of the subject: 
The privacy of the subject should be protected by only 
investigating topics identified as being of interest to the 
investigation (Law et al., 2011; Dehghantanha and Franke, 2014). 
In particular, examination scope should be identified before the 
investigation proceeds.  
P3 IC5, IC7 Justice 
Beneficence 
E3 Only investigate other parties if there is evidence of their 
involvement: 
The privacy of third parties should be protected by only 
investigating them if there is evidence that they have been 
implicated in the topic of the investigation (Van Staden, 2013). 
P3 IC10 Justice 
Beneficence 
E4 Exclude private information: 
During investigation, bookmark private information that is 
irrelevant to the investigation so that it is not included in any 
report. Examples are personal credit card numbers, personal 
passport numbers, and national insurance numbers (John, 2012; 
Dehghantanha and Franke, 2014). 
P4  Respect 
E5 Document all actions: 
Document all data that was examined, judged private and 
irrelevant, and relevant to the investigation  (Saleem et al., 2014; 
Srinivasan, 2007). 
P6, P7 IC8 Integrity 
E6 Facilitate audits: 
Facilitate post-investigation scrutiny (Gay, 2012). 
P9  Integrity 
E7 Report all investigative activities: 
When the investigation is concluded, the report should include 
details of exactly what was examined, who was included in the 
investigation, which devices were examined (and who they 
belonged to) (Losavio et al., 2015), how data was classified as 
relevant (to be reported), confidential (only to be reported if the 
court so orders), irrelevant (not to be divulged) and how the data 
was preserved to prevent any alteration (Saleem et al., 2014; Roux 
and Falgoust, 2012). 
P5, P10  Integrity 
E8 Be transparent about the extent of the investigation, and 
the gathered information: 
Subjects, and their counsel, have to be given the right to know 
what data was processed and how it was processed (Saleem et al., 
2014). 
P9  Respect 
Justice 
E9 Investigators should undergo regular training: 
Investigators should undergo frequent proficiency training and 
testing (Saleem et al., 2014). 
P11  Social 
Responsibility 
E10 Information’s Integrity and Confidentiality should be 
maintained: 
Investigators should carry out investigations lawfully and with 
integrity, and confidentiality (ACPO, 2012; Srinivasan, 2007). 
P11 IC10 Integrity 
 
E11 
Consideration for the well being of investigators 
as highlighted by  Burruss, et al. (2018). 
 
 
 Social 
Responsibility 
Table 4: List of Ethical Principles to Inform Forensics Investigations. 
 
respect for the right to freedom, choice and maintaining democracy for citizens alongside the government’s 
civic duty to administer, govern and protect (Lenoble and Maesschalck, 2003). This aligns well with Rawls’ 
principles of liberty and equality. The limits to government’s power guarantee the citizen certain rights and 
freedoms, and ensure that there can be justice for all.  
Yet there are tensions. On the one hand, there is an expectation of almost 100% security for personal 
transactions such as banking, medical records, and conversations with loved ones, whilst, on the other, 
there is an expectation of full access to carry out digital forensics investigations into the records of criminals 
and terrorists by investigators (Solove, 2001).  
Governments are in the unenviable position of having conflicting dual roles: being both guardians of 
privacy legislation (Bischoff, 2018, EU Parliament, 2018) and overseers of investigative agencies, at the 
same time. The former role requires them to restrict access to personal information, while the latter urges 
extensive harvesting of potentially personal or organizationally-sensitive information. What we have, in 
reality, is a circle that is very difficult to square.   
 
6.1. LAW ENFORCEMENT & SECURITY NEEDS 
The difficulties forensic investigators face is clear. They walk the tightrope between protecting and violating 
citizens’ privacy during their labors. This is made more difficult by a lack of agreement about the definition 
of privacy, on the one hand, and the ability to know when our privacy has been violated, on the other. 
Governments, too, face a conundrum. They react to perceived threats by implementing ever more complex 
and covert surveillance, and enact privacy-invasive legislation (Section 6.1.1). Citizens react by adopting 
ever more sophisticated privacy-protecting technologies, preventing government surveillance (Section 
6.1.2).  
6.1.1.	SURVEILLANCE:		
Governments call for greater and often more intrusive surveillance measures in order to protect citizens and 
provide them with a greater perception of safety and security. Yet there is a danger that, as Ben Franklin 
stated “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither 
liberty nor safety”. The force of argument coming from the security industry, however, is often emotionally 
charged with scenarios of death and disaster that could have been avoided by using their new tool or 
surveillance system. Politicians, the media and the security industry often promote fear of crime, terrorism 
and national security threats to sell ever more sophisticated surveillance and security technologies (Mueller, 
2006).  The loss of privacy and freedom that such technologies constitute appears to be ignored.  
Yet countries in Europe do not have unlimited discretion to put their citizens under surveillance. European 
Courts have ruled that States may not adopt measures that are disproportionate to the right to privacy, even 
in the name of counter-terrorism or organized crime (Limitations of Rights, 1978). The UK’s Investigatory 
Powers Act (IPA) (UK Government, 2016) breaches this, and the national security argument is used to 
justify it.  There is a surprising lack of any mainstream backlash (Renaud et al., 2016).   
6.1.2.	DARK	CLOUDS:		
In parallel to the increasing sophistication and capability of digital investigations to uncover evidence, 
mechanisms designed specifically to preserve privacy have also become increasingly popular. This counters  
the efforts of forensics investigators (Ferguson et al., 2018). The privacy-preserving mechanisms include 
encryption, full disk encryption using tools such as VeraCrypt or Bitlocker, secure network communication 
using Virtual Private Networks, Secure Processors, homomorphic encryption (Gentry, 2009) and 
anonymous routing using TOR (Reed et al., 1998). Cyber criminals are becoming particularly adept at 
preventing forensics investigators from uncovering evidence of their activities by deploying many of these 
mechanisms (Nouh et al., 2019).   
The improvements in cyber security, privacy-preserving tools and encryption could be leading us towards a 
future information blackout for those who carry out digital forensics investigations.  Evidence that this is 
starting to happen includes:  
a) The move away from advice to first responders to simply ‘pull the plug’ (thereby losing provided 
encryption keys) to the use of live imaging techniques rather than the more forensically sound static 
techniques (Voorhees, 2017). 
b) The FBI-Apple dispute (Grossman, 2016) over access to encrypted data on iPhone devices shows 
that the encryption techniques used in consumer devices are now sufficiently strong to prevent law-
enforcement access without the cooperation of the manufacturer. However, the San Bernadino 
Terrorist case (Tanfani, 2018) demonstrates that defects in the implementation of  the encryption 
technology could still be exploited to allow access. 
c) The VPN market has grown dramatically, as analyzed by Statista3, which demonstrates current and 
predicts future widespread adoption of communications encryption by the average citizen.  
d) The increase in the number of ToR nodes from around 2000 in 2010, to between 6000-7000 in 
20194, also reveals an uptake in privacy-preserving technologies.  
Security services and law enforcement are aware of the way these privacy-preserving technologies are 
starting to prevent them from gathering digital evidence. Some governments and law enforcement agencies 
have responded by demanding access to privately held information and the ability to decrypt information 
(Ingersoll, 2013, Vaas, 2019).  
The Five Eyes countries, the intelligence alliance of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA 
(Tossini, 2017), are demanding access to encryption keys (Blanchard, 2017; Afifi-Sabet, 2018; Cuthbertson, 
2017; Newman, 2018), with Australia enacting legislation to mandate that companies divulge their keys 
(The Straits Times, 2018). The FBI in the USA refers to encryption as a ‘major public health issue’ 
(Nakashima, 2018). The outcome will be systems that are vulnerable to hackers, thereby reversing any 
security benefits that encryption and other such tools currently deliver. 
Law enforcement is also increasingly demanding that software companies insert “back doors” (Cox, 2019, 
Dormehl, 2016): secret entrances designed into the system. The problem is that such backdoors will not 
remain secret.  They are likely also to offer an entry to hackers, and are aptly named “back doors” because 
they let people in while the defenders are occupied securing the most obvious entry point: the front door. 
Some companies are defying government demands for backdoors (Talwar, 2019; Owen, 2018). 
Further, it is understood that those who engage in criminal or terrorist activities are likely to be aware of the 
security services’ attempts to monitor them, and so use advanced (or offline) techniques to hide their 
communications.  Therefore, those with the least to hide are also those who are the most surveilled, leaving 
the security services with largely the same problems as before. It is the criminals and terrorists who are the 
most adept at providing false trails, using proxies and finding ways to circumvent the security services, 
whilst the noise and chatter from mass surveillance is in danger of enabling criminals to hide in plain sight. 
Whilst the 'Dark Clouds' identified by Ferguson et al. (2018) constitute the main threat to the continued 
success of the digital forensics discipline, they are not the only difficulties faced by forensics practitioners. A 
further 'Grey Cloud' exists (GC in Table 5) comprising of familiar anti-forensic techniques including: (1) 
artifact-wiping via file-wiping, (2) artifact-wiping via disk-wiping, (3) artifact-wiping via log-wiping, (4) 
data-hiding via vault app, (5) data-hiding via proxy server, (6) data-hiding via IP address-spoofing, (7) trail 
obfuscation via private browsing, and (8) trail obfuscation via e-mail encryption. 
																																								 																				
3	https://www.statista.com/statistics/542817/worldwide-virtual-private-network-market/	
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These measures, whilst not necessarily show stoppers for a given investigation, mandate the use of more 
complex, (thus slower and more expensive) digital forensic techniques. 
Forensics investigators experience difficulties in understanding how to address these issues whilst still 
conducting their investigations and safeguarding communities from crime and terrorism. It is unsurprising 
that they may consider the integration of ethical considerations into their investigations a step too far, given 
the challenges these dark clouds already constitute. Table 5 enumerates four distinct “Dark Cloud” threats 
and one “Gray Cloud” threat to forensics investigations. We shall situate the former within our framework. 
DC1 Full Disk Encryption DC4 E2E Encryption, TOR 
DC2 Memory Encryption DC5 Secure Network Communication 
DC3 File Level Encryption GC Anti-Forensics Techniques 
Table 5: Dark Cloud (DCi) and Gray Cloud (GC) Challenges 
6.2. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY  RIGHTS 
Most countries give their citizens personal privacy rights – at least on paper. Yet the right to privacy is 
viewed by some governments as unimportant (Liberty, 2017; Pool and Custers, 2017; Barbaro, 2017). In 
part, this may be due to the difficulty in pinning down a definition everyone can agree with. People may 
know what privacy means to them, without necessarily being able to articulate their understanding. Gross 
(1967) described this conundrum very well: “Without difficulty we regularly recognise those situations in 
which a violation of privacy is threatened or accomplished, yet stumble when trying to make clear what 
privacy is” (p. 35). Gross (1967) quotes Hart (1954) who says: “We can know yet not understand”. This 
might explain why people do not seem to object when their privacy is taken away from them, even if they 
feel a sense of unease (Renaud et al., 2016). 
This makes our privacy rights somewhat easier to discount or to minimize in perceived importance. Whilst 
we may be willing to accept that criminal investigations might need to sacrifice the individual’s right to 
privacy, this should arguably not extend to violating an entire nation’s privacy in the name of national 
security. UK and European law already has many rigorous measures in place to ensure that the individual’s 
rights are respected. Governments put a great deal of effort into persuading citizens to take their privacy 
seriously, and they pass laws, such as GDPR (European Union, 2018), to ensure that organizations do so 
too. Yet, at the same time, they themselves want to be able to access people’s data. Many, specifically the 
UK, now permit intrusions into people’s digital lives without any judicial oversight (Big Brother Watch, 
2018). 
The old adage, still brought out by the state, the police or any other interested party: ‘if you are doing 
nothing wrong…’ serves to remind us that their desire is to protect us from bad people and that good and 
law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear from the surges in surveillance or erosion of privacy via the 
collection and analysis of personal and often sensitive data. Such widespread surveillance undermines the 
legal presumption of innocence underlying legal process in our society (Milaj and Bonnici 2014), and 
violates Rawls’ equality principle. The problem with this approach is that its adversarial and accusatory 
tone serves to reduce the debate to one whereby advocates of security ‘for your safety’ will accuse those 
voicing concern as being ‘on the side of the criminals’ thus stifling dissenting voices. 
The situation is one in which governments are in the uncomfortable position of having conflicting dual 
roles: being both guardians of privacy legislation and overseers of investigative agencies at the same time. 
The former role requires them to restrict access to personal information, while the latter urges extensive 
harvesting of potentially personal or organizationally sensitive information. 
6.3. ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL CONFIDENTIALITY 
Forensics investigations can impact the three intellectual capital related assertions in Section 4.2 as follows: 
(a) Intellectual capital is valuable: IC is valuable to organizations in terms of contributing towards future 
health and prosperity (Maditinos et al. (2000); Abeysekera (2006); Edvinsson, and Sullivan (1996)). It 
might be valuable to forensics investigators in another way i.e. to help them to join all the dots in their 
investigation. The tension here is that the value of IC to the latter might compromise the value to the 
former if such IC needs to be kept confidential.  
(b) IC disclosure should be controlled: Organizations’ intellectual capital can certainly be damaged by the 
activities of hackers (Snyder and Crescenzi, 2009). Consider, as an example, the Sony hack (Siboni and 
Siman-Tov, 2014). A number of unreleased movies were stolen. The hackers demanded money to return 
the movies. This was essentially a loss of Sony’s intellectual capital and it is estimated that this cost Sony 
$35 million in IT repairs (Hornyak, 2015). 
Our argument is that the activities of forensics investigators could also, inadvertently, damage 
intellectual capital. Beebe (2009) points to the mismatch between the data collection activities of digital 
forensics investigators and organizations’ own policies and procedures for gathering data. This seems to 
be particularly applicable to tangible intellectual capital archives, which the organization may well want 
to keep out of the investigation, but which the investigator may wish to gain access to, in order to carry 
out an exhaustive investigation (IG1).   
La Torre et al. (2018) warn against the “voracity” of big data, and the risk this poses to the intellectual 
capital of an organization. Yet forensics investigations are also potentially voracious as they attempt to 
gather all the information to be able to make a recommendation to a court of law.  
(c) If IC is leaked, or disclosure is uncontrolled, it could damage the organization: If a digital investigator 
decides to pursue a particular line of enquiry, he or she is required, according to the IG1 guideline in 
Table 1, to investigate exhaustively. Moreover, the investigator is also required to record all information, 
whether it be confidential or not (IG4), and to make intangible information tangible (IG5), in terms of 
recording it. Such recorded information could conceivably be presented in court, and the organization 
has lost the ability to control disclosure. In effect, a forensics investigation, unconstrained by 
considerations of investigation scope and remit, might result in uncontrolled disclosure, which could 
feasibly damage the organization’s intellectual capital and their future potential to thrive. 
6.4. MAPPING ETHICS TO INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES 
Ethical Principle aligns (✔) 
opposes 
(✖) 
Investigative Guideline  
E1: Delineate Remit ✖ IG1: Exhaustively investigate 
E2: Respect the privacy of the subject 
 
✖ IG2: Comprehensively record all information 
E3: Only investigate other parties if there is evidence of 
their involvement 
✖ IG3: Investigate all relevant related parties 
 
E4: Bookmark and exclude private information ✖ IG4: Sensitive material should be recorded but marked 
as such 
E5: Document all actions ✔ IG5: Record intangible information 
E6: Facilitate audits 
 
✔ IG6: Give prosecutor record of gathered information 
E7: Report all investigative activities ✔ IG7: Retain all information 
E8: Be transparent about the extent of the 
investigation, and the gathered information 
✔ IG8: Allow accused to inspect information 
E9: Investigators should undergo regular training 
 
✔ IG9: Investigators must be competent to report on 
investigation  
It is now possible to map the investigative guidelines outlined in Table 1 to the ethical principles outlined in 
Table 4.  Table 6 depicts the tensions between the privacy expectations of citizens and organizations and the 
information gathering desires of governments and law enforcement. As you can see, ethical principles E1, 
E2, E3 and E4 do not align with current investigative guidelines. 
6.5. THE SWEET SPOT? 
The danger being faced is that a desire for total safety and security, operationalized without adequate 
checks and balances, particularly if individual freedoms fail to be preserved, may ultimately result in a 
dystopian society where individuals have neither liberty nor equality. In the next section, the PRECEPT 
privacy-respecting framework is proposed to inform ethical digital forensics investigations that will ensure 
that society does not end up at the top left-hand corner of Figure 2. Yet the bottom right-hand corner is 
equally unrealistic and infeasible, given the legitimate needs of our law enforcement bodies. The proposed 
framework aims to inform digital investigations while balancing these tensions 
7. PRECEPT  
A number of digital forensics investigative stages have been proposed in the literature; a selection of these 
are compared and contrasted in Table 8 in the Appendix. All the stages in the left-most column have been 
retained except that of proof/defense because, in our view, this is not part of the investigation process – it 
occurs after the investigation has concluded.  
Pollitt (2016) argues for the importance of planning in successful forensics investigations. He suggests that 
formulating a number of questions that guide the forensics investigator as the investigation is proceeding. 
Ieong (2006) proposes six specific questions along these lines: What (the data), Why (the motivation), How 
(the procedures), Who (the people), Where (the locati0n), and When (the time). These questions, Pollitt 
(2016) argue, help the investigator to bridge the physical investigation and the digital world of evidence 
being explored. Our framework addresses one particular question, “the how”, while the investigator seeks to 
answer the other questions during their investigation.  
A brief explanation of the PRECEPT stages is provided in Table 7 (Stages referred to as Si).  
7.1. EXPERT REVIEW 
PHASE	1	
An expert review was carried out, as advised by Mack and Nielsen (1995).  The framework diagram was sent 
to 6 forensics investigators (2 academics and 4 practitioners), together with the questionnaire provided in 
Appendix A. The questions were essentially qualitative in nature and the responses from the small number 
of experts do not support any quantitative analysis. There were a number of comments related to the need 
to be able to launch a new investigation at any point, so we added the explanatory text in the box to reflect 
that. There were some comments about our descriptions of the stages, which helped us to improve the 
explanations in Table 7. Two argued that acquisition should come after preservation, but this 
misunderstanding was due to a suboptimal description of these stages in our explanations, which we have 
now improved. Another two said they did not usually engage in reconstruction, but they did not object to its 
inclusion in the framework.  
E10: Information’s Integrity and Confidentiality should 
be maintained 
✔ IG10: Information Integrity should be maintained: 
E11: Consideration for the well being of the 
investigator/s 
  
Table 6: Mapping Ethical Principles (Ei) to Investigative Guidelines (IGi) 
One of the expert reviewers, a policeman, said, when referring to identification: “Must understand the 
possibility of residual data (personal details of persons other than the suspect and whether there is a right 
to inspect those details)”. The same policeman said, with respect to search: “It all links back to the agreed 
scope of the investigation and the risk associated with examining the data”. Another reviewer made a 
point of emphasizing the need to delineate the examination scope at the outset. Only minor tweaks were 
made to the original framework based on their feedback.  
PHASE	2	
We subjected the revised framework to further review by 14 forensics investigators as an activity at a digital 
forensics workshop. These investigators were given the diagram, the list of ethical principles and the list of 
dark cloud issues. They were asked to complete the questionnaire provided in Appendix A, and provided 
their feedback. 
Based on their responses we added a new ethical principle: “E11: Consideration for the well being of the 
investigator/s” This was mentioned by a number of evaluators during the workshop, and led to a lively 
discussion.  We expanded S8 to include the considered discarding of irrelevant evidence that had been 
collected during the course of the investigation. S8 now also includes a reflection related to identifying the 
need for support for investigators who might have been traumatized by the investigation. One expert 
highlighted the need to have a record of the investigators who had been involved in the investigation, 
together with a description of their activities, which is now included in the stage S8. We also removed E3 
from the S1 stage, given the argument by two evaluators that it was not possible to identify the subject in 
many cases so early in the process. We added E4 to the S4 stage, based on two evaluators arguing that it 
would not be possible to remove irrelevant information in S8 without the investigator having done this in 
the earlier stages. Finally, a number of the evaluators suggested that we include some color in the diagram 
to make it easier for the reader to identify similar concepts. This also makes the “dark clouds” more salient.  
The final refined PRECEPT framework is presented in Figure 4.  
7.2. DISCUSSION 
The PRECEPT framework was developed to inform digital forensics investigations in such a way that it 
balances digital investigator needs and the privacy and confidentiality rights of individuals and 
organizations.  The framework has been constructed by combining the stages of digital investigations and 
adding in the potential problems of changes in technology to the investigative process (the “Dark Clouds” 
Ferguson et al. (2018) refer to) and also taking into account the rights (in particular privacy) of individuals. 
The included premises have been derived from the extensive debate in the literature, standard investigative 
operating procedures, ethical principles and ethical dilemmas.  The output from the framework is a report 
(taking into account the balance between digital investigator needs and ethical rights) that can be used for 
court as well as the information that a digital investigator can use if a court appearance is required. 
As indicated earlier, the objective of the framework is to provide digital forensics practitioners with a 
structure to navigate the tensions and complex environment (both technical and ethical) within which 
digital investigations take place. The framework seeks to take into account the challenges in digital 
investigations created by the development of new technologies and secure digital platforms, indicated by 
red crosses on the framework diagram. The framework highlights the dilemmas (ethical and otherwise) 
between security and privacy in the context of digital investigations. The framework is set in the context of 
ethical principles and how these should be used to shape digital investigations. In essence, this discussion 
sought to portray the balance between the technical and legal requirements associated with digital 
investigations, the privacy of individuals and the ethical rights of society. 
PRECEPT uses the “life cycle” of a digital investigation from identification through to reporting (the spine 
in the framework diagram derived from the UK’s Core Investigative Doctrine 2015), and contextualizes the 
challenges and issues at each stage utilizing the components and ethical principles derived from the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996).  
PRECEPT aligns the ethical principles (referring to the principles in Table 4) with the various stages of the 
framework. By embedding the principles at the relevant stages in the process, the focus is to encourage the 
digital investigators to consider the principles in addition to the technical and legal aspects at each stage. By 
making these suggestions in the framework, the authors attempt to encourage digital forensics investigators 
and practitioners to broaden their investigations and take at each of the identified stages into account 
during the investigation process. 
 
Figure 4: PRECEPT: Privacy-Respecting Forensics Investigation Framework  
(Si refers to investigation stages in Table 7, DCi refers to challenges to digital investigations i.e. “Dark 
Clouds” listed in Table 5; Ei refers to the ethical principles outlined in Table 4). 
8. CONCLUSION 
This paper draws on the privacy, intellectual capital, investigative guidelines, ethics, anti-forensics and 
forensics investigation stage literature to derive at an ethically-informed framework to guide digital 
forensics investigations. We subjected the derived framework to expert review and refined it accordingly. In 
proposing PRECEPT, we follow the recommendations of a number of researchers, who highlight the need 
for a privacy-protecting framework which balances the needs of investigators with the rights of individuals 
and organizations.  
We hope that the PRECEPT framework will launch a discussion into resolving these tensions and, most 
importantly, to ensure that Rawls’ two core principles of liberty and equality are respected and a societal 
sense of justice is to maximized. We plan to continue to refine the PRECEPT framework, based on feedback 
obtained from interested academics and practitioners in the field. The ultimate aim is to produce a helpful 
resource to forensics investigators, but also reassure the public that their privacy rights are indeed being 
respected and considered. We want to move towards satisfying the requirements of the Daubert test for the 
PRECEPT framework, and to establish a more equitable balance of power between the key stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERT REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Expert reviewers were provided with the list of ethical principles in Section 5 and the first draft of the diagram in 
Section 7 and asked to answer following questions: 
 
1. Is the diagram self-explanatory? 
2. Is the diagram understandable?  
a. If not, what is not clear? 
b. How could it be improved? 
3. Does the depicted forensics process match your reality in terms of forensics investigations? 
4. Please now examine the individual stages. Rank each in terms of: 
 
 Are the components of 
this stage, as depicted in 
the diagram, complete?  
 
If not, what is missing? 
Are the named ethical principles, as 
depicted in the diagram, appropriate for 
this stage? 
 
If not, which should be removed/added? 
In what ways would ethical 
considerations impact the 
investigation? 
Identification    
Acquisition    
Preservation    
Search    
Analysis    
Reconstruction    
Reporting    
 
5. Any other comments or suggestions for improvement are very welcome 
  
R
og
er
s 
et
 
al
. (
20
0
6)
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
Tr
ia
ge
 
U
sa
ge
/U
se
r 
Pr
of
ile
s 
Ti
m
el
in
e 
Ca
se
 S
pe
ci
fic
 
Ev
id
en
ce
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
8:
 A
 S
el
ec
tio
n 
of
 F
or
en
si
cs
 In
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
St
ag
e 
Pr
op
os
al
s 
 
(s
el
ec
te
d 
fr
om
 C
ia
rd
hu
ái
n 
(2
00
4)
 a
nd
 D
u 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
7)
 a
nd
 a
ug
m
en
te
d)
 
 
C
oh
en
 (
20
0
9)
 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
Co
lle
ct
io
n 
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
St
or
ag
e 
An
al
ys
is
 
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
At
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
  D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
C
ia
rd
hu
ái
n 
(2
0
0
4)
 
Aw
ar
en
es
s 
Au
th
or
iz
at
io
n 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
N
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n 
Se
ar
ch
 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
Co
lle
ct
io
n 
Tr
an
sp
or
t 
St
or
ag
e 
Ex
am
in
at
io
n 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
 De
ci
si
on
 
 
R
ei
th
 
(2
0
0
2)
 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
Pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
Pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
Co
lle
ct
io
n 
Ex
am
in
at
io
n 
An
al
ys
is
 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
   
D
FR
W
S 
(2
0
0
1)
 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
Pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
Co
lle
ct
io
n 
Ex
am
in
at
io
n 
An
al
ys
is
 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
 De
ci
si
on
 
 
C
as
ey
 (
20
0
0
) 
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
 Pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
Co
lle
ct
io
n 
D
oc
um
en
ta
tio
n 
Cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
Co
m
pa
ri
so
n 
In
di
vi
du
al
iz
at
io
n 
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
   
K
öh
n 
(2
0
13
) 
Pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
In
ci
de
nt
 
In
ci
de
nt
 
R
es
po
ns
e 
 In
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
  
U
SA
 D
oJ
 
(2
0
0
4)
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t 
Ac
qu
is
iti
on
 
Ex
am
in
at
io
n 
D
oc
um
en
tin
g 
an
d 
R
ep
or
tin
g 
  
 
ID
E
N
TI
FI
C
A
TI
O
N
 
A
C
Q
U
IS
IT
IO
N
 
SE
A
R
C
H
 
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
R
E
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
TI
O
N
 
(H
Y
P
O
TH
E
SI
S)
 
R
E
P
O
R
TI
N
G
 &
 
P
R
E
SE
N
TA
TI
O
N
 
P
R
O
O
F/
D
E
FE
N
SE
 
R
E
FL
E
C
TI
O
N
 &
 
C
O
N
C
LU
SI
O
N
 
 
